Dispute Resolution | Supreme Court rulings rendered during the first quarter of 2026

Ö 7503-25, 2026-03-06

The Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal in a case concerning the requirements for the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal.

Before the District Court, the dispute concerned superior right (Sw. bättre rätt) to shares. In brief, the claimant alleged that the respondent, fraudulently or dishonestly, induced the claimant to sell his shares on the false pretext that the operations of the company to which the shares related would cease. In the alternative, the claimant sought damages from the respondent in the amount of SEK 40 million.

The respondent contested the claims and argued, inter alia, that there was no basis for the claimant’s allegations. The District Court agreed and held, among other things, that the claimant had failed to prove the basic factual circumstances relied on in support of the action and that, on that basis alone, the claims should be dismissed.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, thereby finding that there was no reason to doubt the correctness of the District Court’s judgment, that leave to appeal was not necessary in order to assess the correctness of that judgment, that the matter was not of importance for the guidance of the application of law, and that there were no extraordinary reasons to examine the appeal.

The Supreme Court has now granted leave to appeal. The forthcoming judgment is expected to provide guidance on when the Court of Appeal is obliged to grant leave to appeal, particularly considering that the Court of Appeal rarely provides detailed reasons when refusing leave to appeal.

B 5723-24, 2026-03-12

In a criminal case concerning money laundering, the Supreme Court has provided important clarification on the boundaries of criminal liability for so-called self-laundering (Sw. självtvätt).

The defendant was charged, amongst other things, with storing SEK 610,000 in cash openly on a windowsill — funds found to have originated from criminal activity. The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the mere act of storing proceeds of crime, originating from one’s own criminal activity, is sufficient to constitute a money laundering offence under the Swedish Act on Penalties for Money Laundering Offences (Sw. lag (2014:307) om straff för penningtvättsbrott).

The Supreme Court held that it was not. The Court clarified that criminal liability requires that the act in question be carried out with the specific purpose of concealing the criminal origin of the property or of facilitating someone’s ability to benefit from it. Where self-laundering is concerned, the Court emphasised that many subsequent actions taken by a person in relation to property already in their possession must be regarded as ordinary handling of that property. Accordingly, an additional element demonstrating a money laundering purpose is necessary for criminal liability to arise. In the present case, the Supreme Court concluded that the mere act of storing the proceeds in the manner in which it occurred was insufficient to establish that the act was carried out with such a purpose.

Supreme Court Justice Anders Perklev issued a dissenting opinion, arguing that storing such a significant sum of cash cannot be regarded as an ordinary or everyday act, and that the defendant’s storage of the funds had facilitated the possibility for himself, or somebody else, to later benefit from the criminal proceeds.

While the Court did not clarify which additional elements may indicate that a seemingly “ordinary” act of handling proceeds of crime in fact serves a purpose of concealing their criminal origin, it may be expected that subsequent case law from the lower courts will provide such clarification over time.

Ö 326-25, 2026-03-18

The Swedish Supreme Court has clarified the rules governing international jurisdiction in cross-border sales of goods disputes, specifically in relation to the determination of the “place of delivery” under Article 7.1 of the Brussels I Regulation (No. 1215/2012).

The case arose from a Swedish company’s purchase of scaffolding from a Polish company, which was subsequently transported from Poland to Örebro by an independent carrier. The purchaser, claiming that the scaffolding was defective, brought proceedings before Örebro District Court. The seller contested the jurisdiction of the Swedish courts, arguing that the case should instead be heard in Poland, a position that was accepted by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision and clarified that under Article 7.1 of the Brussels I Regulation, a respondent domiciled in another EU Member State may be sued in the courts of the place of performance of the contractual obligation in question. For contracts for the sale of goods, this is defined as the place where the goods were, or should have been, delivered. Following the Court of Justice of the European Union’s case law, in particular Car Trim (C-381/08) and Electrosteel (C-87/10), the Supreme Court confirmed that the place of delivery must be determined autonomously, without reference to the national law applicable to the contract. The decisive factor is the place where the physical handover of the goods occurred and where the buyer obtained actual control over them at the final destination, not the place where the seller transferred the goods to an independent carrier. Since the physical handover of the scaffolding took place in Örebro, that was the place of delivery and accordingly the place of performance, conferring jurisdiction on the Swedish courts.

Supreme Court Justice Johan Danelius issued a concurring opinion, further emphasising that the starting point in all cases must be what the parties have agreed regarding the place of delivery. He highlighted that determining the place of delivery through contractual interpretation, including the potential relevance of Incoterms and trade usage, involves considerable complexity, and that additional guidance from the Court of Justice of the European Union would be welcome.

The decision is of practical importance for businesses engaged in cross-border trade within the EU, as it confirms that where goods are physically delivered to the buyer in Sweden, Swedish courts will generally have jurisdiction over any resulting contractual dispute, forming an important exception from the general rule of the respondent’s forum of domicile.

PMT 2800-24, 2026-03-31

The Swedish Supreme Court has issued a ruling addressing two important questions in the context of intellectual property litigation: the requirements for clarity and precision in injunctions concerning the use of protected marks and company names, and the application of the prohibition against reformatio in pejus in such proceedings.

The dispute arose between, on the one hand, two Swedish concrete companies and, on the other hand, two German companies operating in the same sector. Following a claim by the Swedish companies, the Patent and Market Court issued an injunction with a penalty against the German companies, prohibiting their use of certain protected marks. Importantly, the injunction was formulated with reference to a number of appended exhibits showing screenshots of websites and advertisements, using the phrase “in the manner that has occurred according to exhibits 2–5″. Upon appeal by the German companies, the Patent and Market Court of Appeal removed this reference, considering it liable to cause interpretative difficulties, on the basis that the prohibition should not be construed as being limited only to uses identical to those depicted in the exhibits.

The Supreme Court, however, held that while the reference to the exhibits was indeed too unclear to satisfy the requirements of precision and clarity that must be imposed on an injunction with a penalty, since it left open the question of whether only uses identical to those shown in the exhibits were covered, the reference nonetheless constituted some form of limitation on the scope of the prohibition. Accordingly, removing that limitation entirely, on appeal brought solely by the German companies, was incompatible with the general prohibition against reformatio in pejus. The Supreme Court further clarified that injunctions in trade mark and company name cases must be formulated with sufficient clarity and specificity. Formulations such as “in a similar manner” are not compatible with the clarity requirements applicable in intellectual property cases, and references to exhibits should be reserved for the marks themselves rather than used to define the scope of the prohibition.

Having found that both the Patent and Market Court’s judgment was too unclear to permit a reliable understanding of its scope, and that the Court of Appeal’s reformulation was incompatible with the prohibition against reformatio in pejus, the Supreme Court annulled both judgments in their entirety and remitted the case to the Patent and Market Court for  reconsideration.